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1 8 . 6 . 9 0
THE ORI GI N AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTION TIME 
PROCEDURE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
BY
MARTIN WESTLAKE(*) * )
(*) Adm inistrator in the Secretariat General of the
Co mm ission of the European Communities. The author 
wishes to make it clear that the views expressed 
in this paper are his own and do not engage any 





















































































































































































The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as 
a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 






















































































































































































I . I nt roducti on
On Wednesday evenings, typically, at the European 
Par liament's plenary sessions in Strasbourg, a curious 
ritual unfolds. Voting on Single Act (Cooperation 
Procedure) reports usually starts at 5.00 p.m.. To 
have any influence on Cooperation Procedure legislation. 
Parliament is required to muster an absolute maj ority - 
260 - of its m e m b e r s * 1 ). The group whips are out in 
force and the chamber is full. Within moments of the 
completion of voting, however, the chamber has emptied, 
the impression of emptiness being further emph asi se d by 
the fact that the television lights have been turned 
off, and the cameramen, normally stationed in the 
hemicycle, sent home. At the same time, the Com mis si on 
bench begins to fill. On occasion, as many as ten of 
the seventeen Co mmissioners may be present. The acting 
President announces a name and a number. A Commissioner 
stands and gives a brief reply. Of the few MEPs left in 
the Chamber (frequently there appear to be more 
Commission ers  than there are parliamentarians), one or 
two might stand and ask short supplementary questions, 
to which the Commissioner will in turn reply. Another 
name and number will then be announced and the 
Com mission will again take the floor, this process being 
repeated for an hour and a half.
This is Question Time to the Co mmission which, 
together with Question Time to the Council and to the 
Ministers meeting in Political Co operation * 3 ) ( j s o n e  
of the more venerable parts of the Pa rli ament's 
proceedings, established in its present form in 1973, 
and tracing its roots back as far as the Common Assembly 
of the EC S C * 3 ). Traditional commentaries, par ti cularly 
before the institution of direct elections in 1979, 
considered Question Time an important weapon in 
Parliament's limited armoury. Fitzmaurice, for example, 
listed it among the five powers of control of the 
P a r l iament*4 ), and Cohen felt it was "clearly more 
than just another supervisory power"; "it provides 
parliame nta ri ans  with one of their principal and regular 
dialogues with the Commission, the Council and the 
Foreign Ministers."*®)
TT5 Art. -7 T ”S'EA; Art. 149, EEC.
(2) Since December, 1976, Question Time has been 
divided into into two parts. Qu estion Time to the 
Council and the Foreign Ministers is invariably 
held on a different, generally earlier, day.
(3) Cohen, 'The Development of Question Time in the 
European Parliament, With Special Reference to the 
Role of British Members,' 16 C .M .L .R e v .1979, p.41.
(4) Fitzmaurice, The European Parliament, Saxon House, 
Farnborough, 1978, p.10. Herman and Lodge, The 
European Parliament and the European Community, 
Macmillan, London, 1978, p.57.




























































































In a formal sense this might still be the case, but 
matters have clearly moved on. The still unfolding 
ramifications of direct elections and the Single 
European Act, to take but the two most important 
institutional developments since 1979, have considerably 
strengthened and extended Parliament's supervisory 
powers. In particular, Commissio ne rs and, increasingly, 
Minist er s of the Council Pres I dency-In-Off ice  are 
frequent visitors to Parliament's specialised Committees 
and regular attenders of Pa rliament's plenary sessions. 
It was evident that direct elections would change both 
the structure and the nature of many of the Parliament's 
procedures. This paper sets out to examine the origin 
and development of one particular aspect of the European 
Parliament's questioning function. Question Time, and 
the way in which its procedures, together with those of 
the other institutions concerned, have evolved.
I I . Origin, Legal Base and Evolution
A pa rliamentary control or supervisory function by 
way of questioning was first established in the ECSC 
Treaty. Art. 23,(3) provided that
"The High Authority shall reply orally or in writing 
to questions put to It by the Assembly or its 
M e m b e r s . “
Art. 23 also established a distinction between the 
ob ligations of the embryonic Commission and Council 
which has persisted to this day, since para. 4 provided 
only that members of the Council "shall be heard at 
their request". In plain terms, the High Authority was 
under an obligation to reply to the Common Assembly's 
questions, whereas the Council could reply if It wished. 
For the first years of the Community's life, the Council 
did not so wish, despite the Assembly's recommendations.
In fact, it was not until after the signing of 
the Rome Treaty that the Council agreed to answer 
Questions put by the now Pa rliamentary Assembly. The 
High Authority had meanwhile begun to answer 
Pa rliamentary Questions - a total of sixty during the 
Common Assembly's life.(7) Another theoretical 
distinction made in ECSC Art. 23 - between Written and 
Oral Questions - was to become increasingly apparent in 
practice, and in the early 1960s the answering 
institutions were to establish their internal 67
(6 ) See the T955 Poher Report, A.C. Docs. 1955/56 n° 2, 
para. 40. See also Lindsay, European Assemblies, 
London, 1960,note 2, p.224.




























































































procedures a c c o r d i n g l y . (8 ) Written Questions 
pre dominated (fifty-seven, against only three Oral 
Questi on s during the whole period (1951 - 1958)). They 
could be tabled at any time. Since the Common Assembly 
met but four times a year on a v e r a g e , O )  the 
possibilit ies  for tabling Oral Questions were limited. 
Indeed, the tabling of an Oral Question was something of 
a political eve n t ( ' 0 )_ to a certain extent reflecting 
the absence of UK parliamentary t r a d i t i o n (1 1 ). With 
the benefit of hindsight, those early Oral Questions 
were far more discernible as antecedents of the current 
Oral Quest io n with Debate p r o c e d u r e ^ ^ ) > a point to be 
returned to later.
Article 140 of the Rome Treaty, the current legal 
basis for Question Time, continued the distinctions 
between the ob ligations of the Council and the 
Commission, and between Written and Oral Questions. Its 
paragraphs 3 and 4 provide that;
“The Commission shall reply orally or in writing to 
questions put to it by the European Parliament or by 
i ts m e m b e r s .
The Council shall be heard by the European 
Parliament in accordance with the conditions laid 
down by the Council in its rules of procedure."
The newly established Parliamentary Assembly had 142 
members, as opposed to the 78 of the Common Assembly. 
This fact, together with the Council's new-found 
readiness to reply, resulted in the tabling of 41 
Questions during the 1958-1959 ses s i o n ^ 1 3 ), and 
similarly large increases in every year thereafter until 
the Qu estion Time procedure itself was instituted in 
1973. Thus, 180 Written Questions and 6 Oral Questions 
were answered in the 1961-1962 session. By 1969-1970,
4
(Ô ) f o r  the Counc i I, see Houben, “Les Conseils de
Ministres des Communautés Européennes", Leyden, 
1964. For the High Authority/Commissio n , see 
Schwed, "Les Questions Ecrites du Parlement 
européen à la Commission," 13 RMC, 1970. For the 
P.E., see EP Rules of Procedure (1958) Rule 25 and, 
for additional conditions, E.P. Docs. 1959, n° 71, 
p. 8 .
(9) See Lindsay, opc.cit., p.218.
(10) See Kateyn, L'Assemblée Commune de la Com munauté 
Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Leyden, 1962.
(11) Although it was a Dutch M P , Henk Vredeling who 
first began, during the late 1960s, to exploit oral 
questions to a maximum. See below.
(12) A more elaborate procedure, governed by Rule 58 of 
the Pa rl iament's current Rules of Procedure. Oral 
Questions with Debate may only be tabled by seven 
or more Members of a Committee, or a political 
group, and are subject to a number of constraints 
on ad missibility and subject matter.




























































































the figures were 508 and 17; in 1970-1971, 583 and 16; 
and in 1971-1972, 641 and 23 r e s p e c t i v e l y . * 141 Cohen 
observes that these increases were “due largely to the 
example set by the persistent questioning unde rta ke n by 
Mr V r e d e I i n g “ . * 151 Fitzmaurice and Jackson recount 
that;
"The Dutch Socialist Henk Vredeling sometimes asked 
as many as 60 per cent of the questions in a year, 
thus earning himself the nickname “Vrageling"
(vragen - to ask). A British Member, Lord O'Hagan, 
topped the table in his period: he is even said to
have placed an advertisement in the press asking for 
material for q u e s t i o n s . ” * 161
The Council's Rules of Procedure did not enlarge on 
the requirements of Art. 140, para. 4 (EEC)*1 7 1 , except 
to provide that any Member of the Council could 
represent it at meetings of the Parliament or 
al ternatively that the Council's views could be 
presented in wri t i n g * 1 6 1 . In the March-April 1960 
Council session, the President of the Council announced 
that it had been decided to forward replies to 
Parliam en ta ry  Questions on matters which the Council had 
already cons i d e r e d * 1 9 1 . Thus, by convention, the 
Council came to accept the distinction made in Article 
140(3), between Written and Oral Questions, and 
belatedly accepted the principle that it was answerable, 
though always on a voluntary basis, to the Parliamentary 
Assembly. However, the Council has never felt itself to 
be under an obligation to be expansive and in any case 
has never been a loquacious institution. Its 
traditional reticence on the one hand, and the 
Comm iss io n's  obligations on the other, are reflected in 
the numbers of Questions tabled to each institution down 
the years. (See Table I) 1456789
(14) C o c k s , TFe European Parliament, H.M.S.O., London 1973, 
p.134. These figures are for parliame nt ary  years. The 
figures given in Table One are for calendar years.
(15) Cohen, op.cit., p.42.
(16) Fitzmaurice and Jackson, The European Parliament, Penguin 
Books, H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1979, p.103. See also Herman and 
Lodge, op.cit., p.62.
(17) Given the way in which the Council's Rules of Procedure
were to develop, the provision of Article 140(4) became 
increasingly inappropriate. The Council Rules of 
Procedure (Luxembourg: Office for Official Pub Ii ca t ions
o? the European Communities, 1987) is an extremely slim 
document, and its articles, twenty in all, are strictly 
limited to internal organisation. The conditions 
governing the Council's responses are in fact laid down in 
a number of decisions, resolutions and agreements, 
together with statements of Pres idene ie s-i n- Office and 
declarations of European Councils.
(18) Cocks, op.cit., p. 134.
(19) Ibid. In 1959, the Council also agreed that mutual 
consultation between Council and Commission might prove 
useful for Questions addressed to both institutions, or 





























































































WRITTEN AND ORAL QUESTIONS TO THE COMMISSION, 
THE COUNCIL, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, 1969-1987
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979
Wr i tten quest ions
Comm iss ion 504 633 637 747 1 152 1 674
Counc i1 1 3 115 115 176 223
Foreign Ministers 4 34 88
Total 505 636 752 866 1 362 1 977
Oral questions
Commission 46 72 42
Counc i 1 34 14 22 7
Foreign Ministers 17 5 4 2
Total 89 103 51 65 98 51
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Wr i tten quest ions
Comm i ss ion 1 995 1 744 2 022 1 946 1 976 2 949 2 671 2 628
Counci I 271 210 256 242 262 258 195 183
Foreign Ministers 57 37 66 49 73 125 157 161
Total 2 323 1 991 2 344 2 237 2 311 3 332 3 023 2 972
Oral questions
Comm iss ion 61 67 63 52 36 68 29 35
Counci I 23 29 22 12 19 19 14 8
Foreign Ministers 5 7 12 6 8 14 7 2
Total 89 103 97 70 63 101 50 45
Source: Forging Ahead, 3rd Edition 1989, 
General for Research, Office for Officia 
Communities, Luxembourg.
European Parliament, 






























































































The Pa rliamentary Ass e m b l y < 2°) es tablished its own 
rules of procedure governing the tabling of Questions. 
These reflected the Treaties distinction between Written 
and Oral Questions, but made a further distinction 
between Questions for Oral Answer Without Debate, and 
those for Oral Answer With Debate. The procedure for 
Questions with Written Answer has remained almost the 
same up to the present day. As Table I makes clear, it 
has become an enormous undertaking, particularly with 
regard to the Commission, with almost 3,000 Written 
Questions tabled in 1987. For a long time it remained 
the predominant method for the Parliament to fulfil its 
supervisory/controI powers, and it has remained a 
ba ckbencher's tool par excellence, making it possible to 
raise issues and glean i nadver tent indiscretions which 
can then be pursued in other w a y s < 20 1 ). The statistics 
show that, as a procedural institution, it is in the 
best of h e a I t h .
Although steadily more hedged about with conditions 
and provisos, the institution of Questions for Oral 
Answer With Debate has also survived more or less in the 
same basic form down to the present day. The procedure 
is similar to, and probably based on the ' interpeI atI on ' 
procedure commonly used in continental p a r I i a m e n t s (2 2 ). 
There was always a trend towards using this variation as 
a device for set-piece political debates, and this has 
now been institutionalised by the 1989-1994 
Parliament's decision to hold thematic grands debats at 
each plenary session, such debates being typical Iy 
ordered around a series of Questions for Oral Answer 
with Debate.
As remarked before, the chief recognisable 
antecedent of Question Time is the procedure for 
Questions for Oral Answer Without Debate. Cocks 
described the procedure thus;
(20) The Par I i amentary Assembly changed its title to the 
European Parliament on 30 March 1962. This change was 
finally enshrined in the Single European Act, signed on 28 
February 1986. Hereinafter the final title, European
Par Ii ament , i s u s e d .
(21) See Fitzmaurice, op.cit., p.150, and Fitzmaurice and 
Jackson, op.cit., p.103.




























































































"As in the case of Questions for Written Answer, 
Questions must be brief and relate to specific 
matters and not to problems of a general nature. 
Under the terms of Rule 46(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Parliament may set aside not more 
than half a day in each part-session for answers to 
Oral Questions. Questions left unanswered after 
this are carried forward to the next par t-s es sio n or 
answered in writing according to the choice of the 
questioner. In plenary meetings, the Member putting 
a Question reads it out and may speak upon it for up 
to ten minutes. The Commissioner or member of the 
Council replying may give a brief reply. If a 
Question is directed to the Commission, the Member 
putt ing  it may ask one or two supplementary 
questions, to which the Commissioner may give a 
brief r e p l y ” ( 2 3)_
Since the advent of Question Time, the procedure has 
fallen into almost complete d isuse^2 4 ) and it is easy 
to see why; in effect, Question Time is a series of 
Oral Questions Without Debate.
Nonetheless, throughout the 1960s, the European 
Par liament's questioning function was assured by these 
three procedures - Questions for Written Answer, 
Questions for Oral Answer Without Debate, and Questions 
for Oral Answer With Debate, governed by their 
correspond ing  Rules (45, 46 and 47 respectively). In 
1973, a fourth variation was introduced.
III. The Introduction of Question Time
Although its exact origin in relation to the 
European Parliament is unclear, the Idea of instituting 
a regular question-and-answer session was already 
gaining currency by 1970 <2 5 ). Several of the Member 
States' pa rliamentary assemblies (e.g., the Belgian 
Chamber of Representatives) had similar procedures, and 
these probably served as inspiration. With an eye to 
the ever-incre asi ng numbers of Questions being tabled, 
and an ear to the underlying interest these represented, 
the Parliament's Enlarged Bureau, on 7 October 1971, 
directed the Legal Affairs Committee to re-examine the 
idea of establishing a regular Question Hour. Mr Memme I 
(D/CD) was appointed rapporteur, and his report, 
together with a proposal for an amendment to Rule 47, 
and annexed guidelines, was unanimously adopted in 
Comm itteeC26).
m i— tbtj:-----
(24) See, e.g.. Summary of the texts concerning relations 
between the European Parliament and the Council, General 
Secretariat of the Council, Sept. 1982, Office for 
Official Publications, Luxembourg, p. 39.
(25) Jacqué, Chronique Parlement Européen, 10 R.T.D.E., 1974,
P .730.
(26) E.P. Does. 1972/73, n° 252, and O.J. 1973 Annex n° 157, 




























































































What then happened was described by the rapporteur as a 
"regular chapter of accidents"(27)_ First, the 
Commission "raised some difficuIties " (2 8 1 . The 
Committee re-opened the discussion on its report on 20 
March 1972, taking on board the Commission's objections 
and making an addition to the report. The newly 
enlarged report was adopted by the Committee on 24 April
1972, but found no favour with the Enlarged Bureau. In 
September, 1972, this latter made new proposals, so that 
the report was again referred back to Committee. The 
document and the amendment to the Rules of Procedure 
were not finally debated and adopted until January,
1973. This happened to be the first Parliamentary 
session in which the new British arrivals
p a r t i c i p a t e d (2 9 ). The influence of the Westminster 
model was broadly a cknowledged^3 9 ) , but although 
British pa rl ia mentarians were to make the device 
largely their o w n ^ 3 1 ), the coincidence of Question 
Time and British participation was purely contrived:
"... when the Bureau of the European Parliament and 
the Legal Affairs Committee took up this suggestion 
of introducing by means of a Rule 47(a), a time 
reserved for questions in our European Parliament, 
we imagine that they were not altogether unmindful 
of the fact that our British colleagues were to 
join us on the benches. It is a kind of welcoming 
present: so that our colleagues should not feel
out of their element, this debate has been placed 
on today's a g e n d a . ” (3 2 )
(771 0 . J ., Annex n° 157, 18.1.73, p.98.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Although the delegation was at half-strength; 
the October 1972 Labour Party Conference and a 
December 1972 Parliamentary Labour Party meeting 
decided that no Labour MPs should attend the 
European Parliament until the terms of UK entry 
into the EC had been renegotiated. Labour 
members finally took up their seats after the 
June 1975 referendum. See, e.g. Butler and 
Marquand, European elections and British 
politics, Longman, London, 1981, especially
Ch . 2 .
(30) Fitzmaurice and Jackson, op.cit., p.104.
(31) See Cohen, op.cit., p.58.
(32) O.J. Annex n* 157, 18.1.73, p.104. See also Jac qu 6 , op. 
cit. p.729. Cohen points out that, although interest in 
the Parliament ran high, the 1972 "Vedel Report" (Report 
of the Working Party Examining the Problems of the 
Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament, 
Bulletin of the E.C., 1972, Supp. 4) made only a casual, 





























































































The new Rule 47(a) read as follows;
"1. A question time shall be set aside at the 
commencement of the second or third sitting day 
during the part-session, when any Repre se nta ti ve may 
put a brief oral question to the Co mmission or 
Counc i I .
Rule 46 shall not be affected by this provision.
The detailed procedure for the conduct of questions 
shall be governed by guidelines.
2. Before the close of question time any political 
group or at least five Re presentatives may request 
that a debate be held immediately thereafter on the 
Co mm ission's answer to a clearly defined question of 
general topical interest during which brief oral 
questions, suggestions or comments may be addressed 
to the Commission of the European Communities.
Rule 47 shall not be affected by this provision.
The detailed procedure for the conduct of such 
debates shall be governed by g u i d e l i n e s . ”
Five points are of particular interest in this first 
version. First of all, the backbencher's sovereign 
right ("any Repr e s e n t a t i v e ” ) is enshrined. Secondly, 
Rule 46, governing Questions for Oral Answer Without 
Debate, clearly was affected by this new provision, as 
was seen above. Thirdly, the innovation of leaving 
detail to annexed guidelines was introduced. Fourthly, 
the provision for an immediate debate of general topical 
interest would, despite para. 2 ., second indent, to the 
contrary, seem to have impinged on the provisions of 
Rule 47, governing Questions for Oral Answer With 
Debate. In plain terms, the pioneering rules for 
Question Time fell, with a considerable degree of 
overlap, between the rules governing Oral Answers With 
and those Without Debate. The Legal Affairs Committee's 
final draft still wavered between the one and the other, 
between the broad edge of topical debates with detailed 
questioning, and the cut-and-thrust of sharp 
parliamentary scrutiny. This divergence was reflected 
in the parliamentary debate before a d o p t i o n ( 33)_
Lastly, and in the same vein, the provision in para. 2 
for debate initially applied only to the Commission.
The rapporteur made the reason for this clear;




























































































"We can constrain the Commission to come here, we 
can even send it away, if we so wish and agree.
With the Council we are powerless. We are dependent 
on its grace, favour and benevolence. For that 
reason in Rule 47(a) we deliberately refrained from 
including the Council. It is true that the Council 
has now agreed to attend Question Time, but not the 
debate, if so r e q u e s t e d ."(3 4 )
Mr BROEKSZ (Nl), spokesman for the Socialist Group, 
considered it “very important that when questions are 
put the Commissioner concerned and, we would hope, the 
President of the Council or his Deputy, will be present 
to answer the Q u e s t i o n s .“ *35) Mr BAAS (N), spokesman 
for the Liberal and Allies Group, agreed with Mr BROEKSZ 
that "for a discussion to be truly topical the 
Commission and the Council would have to be present 
here. We can read the stereotype answers by the 
Council, but they are not sufficiently interesting to 
attempt delving deeper into the materia I.*3 6 *
However, Mr BROEKSZ recognised that “Only when the 
Commission is present can Question Time become a 
s u c c ess.'*3 7 *, and the rapporteur was under no 
illusions about the importance of Commission cooperation 
if the institution were to serve any useful purpose.
For the Commission, Mr SCARASCIA MUGNOZZA, an Italian 
Vice-President, made perfectly clear the Commission's 
intention to engage in such cooperation;
" ... the Commission is very happy that there should 
be scrutiny of its administration. This is one of 
the reasons why, in organising the Commission 
departments, we agree that the size of the staff 
working on pa rliamentary questions should be 
increased so that replies to both oral and written 
question may be as prompt, detailed and 
co mprehensive as possible. This progress is 
apparently slight but is undoubtedly of great 
importance, and the Commission will not try to evade 
its responsibilities ...
"The Commission for its part, intends to deal with 
any questions put to it in a st raightforward and 
committed fashion, for we believe that only in this 
way can we move forward towards building Europe ... 
we shall do our utmost to see that this new 
procedure is adopted by the Commission, to see that 
the debate is brief but also very clear, providing 
proof of the continued link between the Commission 
and the European P a r I i a m e n t ."* 38)
The Council was absent from the debate.
("34l 0. J . . Annex n° 157, 18.1.73, p.109.
(35) Ibid. , p. 100.
(36) Ibid. , p. 101 .
(37) Ibid. , p. 110.



























































































- 1 1 -
Ultimately, however, the Council's attitude was not 
quite as dark as Mr MEMMEL had painted it. In 1973, the 
Council adopted a number of general principles for 
Written and Oral Questions. In particular, the Council:
confirm(ed) its decision to reply to all written 
questions and express(ed) its intention to reply 
henceforth to all oral questions put to it;
(was) prepared to take all steps necessary to 
improve or speed up the procedure for preparing 
replies to written and oral q u e s t i o n s . " ( 3 9 )
Moreover, in relation to Rule 47A (2) (Debate at the 
end of Question Time), the Council adopted a further 
principle:
" ... If, at the end of Question Time, the 
Parliament wished to hold a debate on the basis of a 
reply given by the Council, the latter would within the 
limits of its powers contribute to that d e b a t e . " ( 4 0 )
Lastly, in April, 1973, the Council esta bl ish ed  an 
internal procedure for the preparation of its 
repli e s ( 41 ) .
But in two important respects Parliament's 
mis givings about the Council's probable attitude were 
well-founded. First, Pa rliamentarians frequently 
accuse the Council of observing the letter and ignoring 
the spirit of the procedure. Much of this has to do 
with the Council's previously r e m a r k e d - u p o n , 
traditional reticence, and much of that reticence has 
to do with the way in which replies are prepared under 
the internal procedure referred to above. It is the 
Council General Secretariat, monitored by the permanent 
representations meeting together in the Working Party 
on General Affairs, which prepares the draft texts of 
replies. Such a procedure hardly lends itself to 
loquaciousness. Furthermore, it has become an 
unwritten convention of Council Presidencies that the 
Minister taking Question Time should stick to the 
prepared text, and that answers to Su pplementary 
Questions should be kept short and to the point. These 
und er standable tendencies were the antithesis of what 
the Parliament had sought.
In a second important respect the Council, together 
with the Commission, disappointed the Parliament;
"... the efficacity of Question Time is und ermined 
by the fact that the Parliament questions the 
Commission and the Council on different days, and
r3T) R/2641/73.
(40) Ibid.




























































































neither body is formally present to hear the other's 
replies or to participate in debates to which these 
replies Iead . " * 4 2 5
Neither institution was prepared to embarrass, nor be 
embarrassed, in front of the other, and this con vention 
has continued to the present day.
Herman and L o d g e * 435 drew attention to another 
aspect of the Council's apparent reticence, which they 
dubbed "the pa rliamentary vacuum." The problem, which 
was finally resolved, although not ne cessarily solved, 
by the establishment of a di rec tly-elected Parliament in 
1979, was defined as being "where political 
responsibility can be located in neither the national 
nor the European pa rliamentary b o d i e s . " * 445 in 1976, 
the then President of the European Parliament, Mr 
Georges SpAnale, commented that;
“ ... It is absolutely essential that the Council 
should think again about this problem, since the 
replies which have been given are not satisfactory.
In fact, after replying 'We cannot speak about these 
matters because they are confidential', you add 'But 
you can ask your Minister for the answer in your 
national Parliament.' In other words, the 
Pres I dent-1n-Office of the Council can reply in the 
Netherlands Parliament, as the Ne therlands Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, to those of our colleagues who 
are Members of the Netherlands Parliament, but he 
cannot reply to them here as Pres I dent-in-O ff ice  of 
the Council. This means that from the Council, 
which is a Community institution, we can only obtain 
fragmentary replies in our national parliaments! 
Furthermore, by a curious prismatic process, the 
replies which our Ministers give to our national 
parliaments do not always coincide exactly, which is 
not satisfactory e i t h e r . " * 455
Ironically, while direct elections resolved one problem, 
they merely made the latter Invisible since, with the 
exception of certain specialised committees in some 
Member States' pa rli aments*4 6 5 , national Ministers are 
no longer subjected to any sort of scrutiny of their 
actions In the Council by members of the European 
Parliament, save when their Member State holds the EC 
Presidency, and then only in that capacity. 42356
(42) Merman and Lodge, op.cit., p . 57. It was not ever thus. 
Before Question Time was split into sections held on 
different days, representatives of the two institutions 
were physically, but not formally, present at the same 
time.
(43) Ibid., pp. 57-58.
(44) Ibid. , p.58.
(45) O.J., Annex n* 209, 17.11.7$, p.87.
(46) See 'Bodies within National Parliaments 
specialising in European Community Affairs',
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It is instructive to look briefly at some of the 
contribut io ns to the debate held immediately prior to 
the adoption of the Question Time procedure, since these 
clearly establish the Parliament's original intentions 
and expectat i o n s .
The rapporteur, Mr MEMMEL, made much reference to 
the UK House of Commons where “Question Time has proved 
to be an important parliamentary instrument which 
influences public opinion, and is a means of subjecting 
the government and the administration to constant 
supervis ion  and c r i t i cism."<4 7 ) He hoped that “ the 
genuine parliame nt ar y instruments" of Question Time and 
debate might "serve to some extent to draw the European 
Parliament out of its shadowy existence. Que st ion  time 
and debate may arouse public interest in the sittings of 
the Parliament, and perhaps serve to draw closer the 
bonds between it and other inst it uti on s." ( 48 >
For the Christian Democratic Group, Mr MEISTER (D) 
also stressed the public opinion angle; “not only will 
it provide an effective instrument to influence the 
public, but ... public interest in the Parli am ent 's  task 
will be aroused and promo t e d 4 9 ) For the Socialist 
Group, Mr BROEKSZ (NU) felt it gave Parliament "the 
opportun ity  to prod in cases of bureau cr acy and 
inattention by the Commission and its services and by 
the Council and its s e r v i c e s .” (50) For the Liberal and 
Allies Group, Mr BAAS (NL) saw Question Time "as an 
opportun ity  for airing topical matters on which policy 
matters are soon to be taken, "(51) while Mr LEFEBVRE 
(B/LIB) saw its purpose as “to question the Commission, 
or if appropriate the Council of Ministers, on the 
application of the T r e a t i e s ."(8 2 ) However, perhaps the 
most succinct definition was left to a new British 
Con se rvative member, Sir Derek WALKER-SMITH;
"The real value of a regular question time is that 
it imposes on the executive the knowledge that all 
their actions are subject to parl ia menta ry  scrutiny 
and interrogation and will be examined closely and 
conscient ious ly  in the interest of those millions 
whom we here seek to represent. That knowledge has 
a tonic effect on executive bodies. It is a spur 
where speed is needed and a brake where 
ad mi nistrative considerations are in danger of out- 
runn i ng popuI a r will.
The attitude of Parliament to the executive should 
be one of criticism and inquiry, tempered by the 
realisation that action, ad min istration and the 
effective practice of government is inherently and
(47) 6 . J . , Annex n
(48) Ibid. . p .99.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid. , p.100.
(51 ) Ibid. , p . 1 01 .




























































































inescapably more difficult than the task of comment 
and criticism without the function of government, 
which is all that rests with us here in this 
Chamber. The relationship should therefore be one 
of continual confrontation stopping short of 
c o n f l l e t . "(53)
Pa rl ia mentarians recognised that a number of 
elements would be vital for the success of the new 
procedure. Three - garnering a sufficiently high level 
of press attention, the cooperation of the other 
institutions involved, and the simultaneous presence and 
willi ng nes s to participate of both Commission and 
Council, together with a general willingness to enter 
into the spirit of the new procedure - have already been 
mentioned. A fourth was the need for the Commissioner 
responsible for a particular dossier to take questions 
re I evant to it.
"Will the Co mmissioners to whom the questions are 
put be present at the time when the question is put? 
Or will they not be present?
"The position should not be that the one 
Commissioner says to the other: “You are going to
the meeting anyway, this is my answer, just read it 
out; and as to the supplementary questions, you 
will be able to get round them." If it is done like 
this, the plan will fail. It will fail because it 
will not then be possible to carry on the debate 
that may lie behind it with the Commissioner 
concerned. I consider it very important that when 
questions are put the Commissioner concerned and we 
would hope, the President of the Council or his 
Deputy, will be present to answer the q u e s t i o n s ."(54)
"A reply by a Commissioner other than the one 
responsible seems to me of little purpose. As soon 
as Parliament knows that the Commissioner is 
reading the reply. It would find it particularly 
easy to embarrass him by means of su pplementary 
questions. I therefore hope that the Commission 
will prepare itself. From the reply to a 
su pplementary question we shall know whether the 
Commissioner knows exactly what he has told us or 
whether he has merely read out a piece of prose 
that has been prepared for him. I urgently appeal 
to the Commission and the Council that they be 
aware of this. It is stated quite clearly in the 
proposal that two supplementary questions may be 
put. The supplementary questions offer an 
op portunity of testing the Commission or the 
Counc i I."(55)
The Commission's reply to this point was that:
rST) Ibid., p .103.
( 5 4 )  I b i d . ,  p . 1 0 0 .




























































































"We wish Co mmissioners to be able to attend all the 
me etings in person, to be present at the sittings of 
the House and to reply in person to all the problems 
raised. Obviously a Commissioner may be absent from 
time to time, but in that case another Commissioner 
will take over with equal authority. This will be 
the exception, however, not the rule.''^5 6 ^
Lastly, there was recognition of the need for 
procedural strictness and for empathetic rulings from 
the Chair;
“We must remember, however, that it will be 
favourable only if Question Time is conducted at an 
ap propriately high level and does not deviate into 
humdrum questions, questions which perhaps do 
trouble Members and indeed must trouble them, but do 
not come within the responsibility of the Com mission 
or the Council. Very precise conditions must, 
therefore, be laid down for questions to be 
accepted: questions must be clearly worded, relate
to concrete problems, and should not deviate into 
abstract generalities; they must be so framed as to 
elicit short and clear answers which can be given 
without time-consuming preliminary work, detailed 
study or research, etc. Questions on the agenda for 
the day should not be raised, since we do not wish 
to bypass, favour or relegate to Question  Time the 
discussion of items on the agenda.
"The principle is also important, Mr President, that 
questions must in fact be asked, rather than 
explanations, statements, assessments or other 
irrelevant matter be o f f e r e d .“(5 7 )
“ It will be for the President to make Question Time 
into what we want, namely a genuine exercise of 
control by Parliament over the Co mmission and a way 
of drawing Parliament's existence to the attention 
of the general public more fi r m l y . “(58)
In this context, the Legal Affairs Committee had 
been at pains in drafting the annexed gu idelines (or 
vade-mecum, as it was sometimes referred to) to ensure 
that Question Time was more likely to result in 
institutional dialogue rather than a series of speeches 
or detailed, considered, po sition-1aking . It is a 
compliment to that Co mmittee's work that, with one or 
two minor changes, those guidelines have survived more 
or less intact down to the present day.
Questions must fall within the competence of the 
institution to which they are addressed, and must be of 
general interest. They must be brief, concisely 
formulated, and must refer to specific points. They 
cannot refer to a matter being dealt with elsewhere in 
Par li ament's agenda, cannot contain assertions or
T S 6 l Ibid., p .108.
(57) Ibid., p .99.




























































































opinions, must not relate to personal matters, and 
cannot request documentation or statistical information. 
Decisions on admissibility, of the original questions 
and any supp I e m e n t a r i e s , are the prerogative of the 
President of Parliament, or Chair of a sitting, 
re sp ectively^5 9  60).
The first Question Hour took place on Tuesday, 13 
February 1973^®°). Six questions were taken, all of 
them to the Commission. There were twenty supplementary 
questions, and the Chair had to rule on the 
admissibility of two of them. Five questions were not 
taken. At their authors' requests, four were held over 
to the March 1973 Question Hour, while a fifth received 
a written reply. A twelfth question, on Community 
relations with China, was withdrawn after the author had 
called, in accordance with Rule 47A(2), for an hour's 
debat e^6 1 ). It was a fairly accurate indicator of how 
Question Time was likely to develop over the next six 
years; most of the typical elements were there.
IV. Question Time Developments; 1973-1979
As with many Parliamentary procedures, Question Time 
evolved steadily by way of a combination of adjustments 
in practice, undertakings by the institutions concerned, 
and developing customs. However, the basic framework 
remained essentially unaltered.
Questions were first addressed to the Council very 
early on, in April, 19 7 3 . <6 2  634) Eight questions were 
taken during Question Hour, six addressed to the 
Commission, and two to the Council. These concerned the 
inconclusiveness of certain Council meetings, and the 
powers of the Parliament. Of the twenty sup plementary 
questions taken, four were addressed to the Council.
In July 1973^®®), in a celebrated incident,
Commissioner Lardinois was absent and the Commission was 
unable to answer a series of questions on agricultural 
matters. Commissioner Lardinois was, it transpired, at 
the London Royal Show, together with another 
Commissioner, Sir Christopher Soames, this knowledge 
leading to the considerable discomfiture of the 
Commissioner present, Vice-President Scarascia Mugnozza.
The incident was the first of a series where the 
Commission was obliged to re-affirm the principle that 
par li amentarians have
"a perfect right to demand, to require and to 
request that Commissioners who are responsible for a 
particular dossier should be able to be 
p r e s e n t ".(64)
(59) See Jacqu 6 , op.cit., pp. 729-730 for a 
contemporary analysis of the Question Hour rules.
(60) O.J., Annex n* 158, 13.2.73, pp. 40-53.
(61) Ibid., p p . 54-60.
(62) O.J., Annex, n° 161, 5.4.73, pp. 53-71.
(63) O.J., Annex, n° 164, 3.7.73, p p . 15-23.




























































































Whether such attendance Is obligatory is debateable. In 
practice, the Commission has continued to favour the 
principle, and its efforts to comply with it have led 
to periodic calls for the Parliament to order its work 
more reasonably. The general record of the attendance 
of ap propriate Co mmissioners at Question Time has 
remained g o o d ( 6 5 ) _  despite increasingly busy schedules 
and the absence of any positions corres pon din g to those 
of junior ministers in national governments. There are 
several reasons for this. In the first place, and as 
Vic e- President Scarascia Mugnozza announced at the 
outset, the Commission established internal mech ani sm s 
and procedures so that, within its overall co I I egia I ity , 
individual competences and responsibilities could be 
determined. However, perhaps just as important, and 
quite apart from the proprietal interest Commiss io ner s 
might feel about particular dossiers, Commiss io ner s have 
tended to come from long and distinguished parlia me nt ary  
backgrounds, engendering in them a feeling of political 
obligation. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that 
many Commiss io ne rs  enjoy their encounters with the 
Parliament; Mr Sutherland, Mr An driessen and Mr 
Bangemann, three recent examples, all clearly enjoy the 
cut-and-1hr ust of debate at Question Time.
The first question to the President of the Foreign 
Ministers meeting in European Political Coop er ati on  was 
tabled in March, 1 9 7 6 (6 6 ). Parliament was deliberately 
jumping the gun, and Mr THORN was obliged to point out, 
in his official capacity as Pr esi dent-in- 0 ffice , that 
Que stion Time was not yet applicable to problems of 
political cooperation. Having issued this caution, 
however, he proceeded to answer the question, and this 
de facto extension of the procedure was later confirmed 
by Mr THORN, as President of the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, in a letter to Parliament's P r e s i d e n t (6 7 ).
In December 1976, Question Hour was extended to 
three hours, one and a half hours devoted to the 
Com mission and one and a half hours to the Council and 
to the E P C , it later becoming the custom for a half hour 
to be devoted to the e p c(68). This extension was a 
direct response to the rapid increase in the number of 
questions tabled (1973/74, 126; 1974/75, 136; 1975/76,
249).(69) The sudden increase in 1975/76 can be 
largely attributed to the belated arrival of the full 
complement of British MEPs. With the addition of the 
British Labour members in July, 1975, the British 
contingent rose from 21 to 36. In the year that 
followed, the number of questions tabled by British 
members all but doubled, from 46 to 91. Cohen surmised 
that "an element of friendly rivalry between the
(65) To take a very recent example, during the February 1990 
plenary session, when Question Time to the Com mission was 
switched at relatively short notice to the night session, 
no fewer than 9 Commissioners were present.
(6 6 ) O.J. Annex n" 201, 10.3.76, p p . 15-16.
(67) 10 May 1976.
(6 8 ) February, 1977. See O.J. Annex n° 212, 9.2.77, 
p p .106 - 108.




























































































established Conservative members and the new Labour 
arrivals may have transmitted itself from the House of 
Commons to the European Par Iiament“ .(70)
By 1979, British members were asking on average some 
60% of all supplementary quest ion s^ 7 1 5 . Cohen went on 
to argue that, since members could only ask one 
sup plementary question, this emphasised "a high degree 
of political t e a m w o r k ."(7 2 ) There are two more mundane 
explanations, however. First, since more British 
members were tabling questions, more would tend to be 
sitting in the chamber , waiting for their question to 
come up. Second, some at least of the high number of UK 
suppIemen ta rie s can also be explained by traditional, 
W e s t m i n s t e r - s t y I e , cross-floor, party-political banter, 
which does not necessarily require teamwork.
Cohen admitted that this predominance gave “a 
peculiarly British character to the p r o c e e d i n g s ”(7 3  ̂
and accurately predicted “that the eighty-one British 
Members of the future European Parliament will still 
play a leading role in the Question Times to c ome".^7 4 ) 
Overall, he was relatively sanguine about the general 
health of the proceedings. The majority of questioners 
were receiving an oral reply from a representative of 
the institution concerned during the Question Time 
se I e c t e d (7 8 ). He also noted a certain eagerness on the 
part of the Foreign Ministers to p a r t i cipate^7®) , and 
speculated that this might be partly traced to the 
political op portunity this provided to test the 
acceptability of their policies in a European 
parliam ent ar y environment.
Cohen went on to examine the differences between 
Question Times in the House of Commons and in the 
European Parliament. In the first place, a substantial 
part of Commons Question Time "is devoted to making 
party propaganda and ... the success of a Question may 
depend upon the extent to which the political parties 
... and the media and pressure groups, take up the 
issue."(7 7 ) In the case of Question Time in the 
European Parliament, neither the Commission nor the 
Council Pr es Id en cy-in-Office has a political colour, and 
party (or group) political propaganda is largely 
irrelevant.
In the second place, "the function of Question Time 
in the House of Commons is further di stinguished from 
that of the European Parliament by the tradition that 
British Ministers may be questioned, not only on matters 
for which they are statutorily responsible, but also 
concerning grievances of a general n a ture".^7 8 ) Such
m r r Ibid. , P . 53
(71 ) Ibid. , P . 54
(72) Ibid.
(73) Ibid. , p . 54
(74) ibid. , P . 59
(75) Ibid.,, p . 46
(76) Ibid.,. P . 48





























































































generalised questioning is clearly excluded by 
Par li ament's rules but, even if it were not, it would 
have little purpose in a context devoid of the 
traditional Westminster roles of 'Government' and 
'Opposition'. This also partly explains the absence of 
"inspired q u e s t i o n i n g ” , another Westminster practice, 
whereby planted questions from friendly par li ame nt ari an s 
enable Ministers to make policy statements. Such 
practice would in any case be redundant, since the 
Treaties grant the Commission and the Council an 
unr es tricted right to be heard in the P a r I i a m e n t .{7 9 )
In retrospect, Cohen's review also identified some 
of the seeds of the procedure's relative decline. In 
the debate accompanying the adoption of the procedure,
Mr BAAS had spoken of Question Time as "an opportuni ty  
for airing topical matters". But, as Cohen pointed out;
"the po ssibility of raising such topical issues is 
to some extent limited by the requirement that all 
Questions must be tabled at least one week before 
the relevant Question Time begins. In practice, 
bearing in mind the virtual necessity of sending 
many of these Questions in by post from abroad the 
effective delay between the date on which the 
Question is first conceived by the Member and the 
date on which it is actually asked in the European 
Parliament may be considerably longer than a week.
In political terms this could represent a 
substantial delay so that really topical matters, 
i.e. issues of an urgent or immediate nature, cannot 
always be conveniently raised in this way. Although 
the Rules of Procedure do make pr ovision for giving 
shorter notice of Questions, this can only be done 
if the Institution concerned is a g r e e a b I e .(80)
Moreover, as pointed out in Section III, the 
Question Time procedure overlapped co nsi derably with the 
procedure for Oral Answer with Debate. The difference 
in purpose between a debate of “general and topical 
interest" following Question Time and a debate following 
an Oral Answer by one, or both, institutions was never 
clear from the outset, and was to become increasingly 
blurred. Further, the latter had the advantage of 
potential involvement of both institutions (by way of a 
joint debate), while the unintended effect of the rules 
of admissi bi li ty  for Question Time was the virtual 
dis qu al ifi ca tio n of most topical debate.
TT9"5 ECSC Art . 23(2), EEC Art. 140(2), and EAEC Art. 110(2).




























































































Cohen also identified an increasing abuse of the 
procedure. He pointed out, first, that very few of the 
starred Questions on the House of Commons Order Paper 
actually receive an ora! reply on the da y(8 1 ), so that 
"... the relative speed of the written answer can be 
worth the loss of the chance to ask a supplementary 
q u e s t i o n ” .(8 2 ) The opposite, Cohen argued, was the 
case in the European Parliament, where written answers 
could take two or more months from the date on which the 
Que stion was submitted.
"As a result, the use of Question Time in the 
European Parliament has the double attraction for 
Members of providing, not only greater pressure on 
the Institution concerned, but also the probability 
of a much faster reply than by using the written 
procedure. In the case of Questions to the 
Commission, this pressure is emphasised by their 
ob li gation under the Treaties to answer such 
Ques t i o n s .“ (8 8 )
In fact, a checklist of the conditions for success 
that Members had enunciated in 1973 shows that none had 
been fully met by 1979. Above all. Question Time had 
failed to garner a sufficiently high level of press 
attention. Until 1979, this failure was perhaps hidden 
by the Parliament's general failure to attract press 
coverage, and it could be argued that it is impossible 
to make sensational revelations about intrinsically 
obscure matters. However, the record since 1979, with 
rapidly increasing general press coverage and a 
burgeoning public image for the Community in general and 
the Parliament in particular, shows clearly that this 
was not and is not the root cause.
When it came to the cooperation of the other 
institutions involved, the record was mixed. As has 
been noted, the Foreign Ministers displayed a certain 
eagerness to participate effectively. As has also been 
noted, both the Commission and the Council laid down 
internal procedures and mechanisms to facilitate their 
active participation in the exercise. In retrospect, it 
was perhaps unrealistic to suppose that, given their 
composite nature and the absence of oppositional 
political platforms, the Council and the Commission 
might have been able to successfully activate a model 
taken from an adversarial system of which, in any case, 
few of their members had any first-hand knowledge.
(81) Ibid. , pp \ 46-47 . During the 1988-89 par liamentary
session, for example, no less than 23,392 question 
tabled for answer. Only 2,417 were reached by Min 
Sessional Returns 1988-89, Commons Paper 110, H.M. 
T W S T ----------------------------
(82) Rush, The Member of Parliament and his Information 
London , 1970, p .14.
(83) Cohen, op.cit., p. 47.
s were 
i s t e r s . 




























































































By tacit agreement, Council and Comm iss io n were 
never of fi cially simultaneously present and this 
arrangement was formalised when Parliament extended the 
duration of Question Time to three hours and divided it 
into sections taking place on separate days. (See 
above) As has been seen, "incidents" occurred, where 
the appropriate Commissioner was not present, and, 
perhaps more for procedural reasons than out of any 
institutional conservatism, the Council was reticent in 
its replies. Lastly, rulings from the Chair were 
u n e v e n .
Cohen wrote of “the dilemma of Community 
parliam en ta ri ans  who, unlike national M.P.s questioning 
Ministers in national parliaments, cannot reinforce 
their qu estioning with an express or implied threat of 
bringing party political pressure to bear at a Community 
level .“ (84) And concluded that ” ... however lively and 
co ns tructive the Question Time dialogue may become, in 
the end result, without additional legal powers, the 
outcome is heavily dependent on institutional co­
operation. "(85) The forthcoming elections of June,
1979, brought a faint ray of hope;
"... the po ssibility of future Question Times gradually 
evolving as part of a sharper co nfrontation betwen the 
European political groups cannot be ruled out once the 
Members of the European Parliament are directly 
elected. (8 6 )
V. From 1979 to the Present Day
The ne wly-elected Parliament inherited its rules of 
procedure from its appointed predecessor, although its 
Committee on Rules almost immediately began work on a 
major o v e r h a u l , the new rules being adopted on 4 
May 1981(88) # However, the rules and gu idelines 
relating to Question Time were unchanged.
i) The 1979 Direct Elections
The institution of elections had four direct effects 
and one indirect effect on Question Time, all of them 
tending to erode its relative importance and efficacity.
In the first place, Parliament's mem ber sh ip shot up 
from 198 in the Parliament of the Nine (1973 - 1979) to 
410 in July, 1979, and 434 in January, 1981^®®), with 
initial co rresponding increases in the number of 
Questions tabled, as Table 2 Illustrates. Less 
obviously, perhaps, Parliament's work quota also shot 
up, as Table 3 indicates, thus reducing the relative 
importance of the three hours per session devoted To’
T84T---Ibid. , p.57.
(85) Ibid. , p .50.
(8 6 ) Ibid. , p .50.
(87) The Luster Report. D o c .1-926/80.
(8 8 ) O.J. Annex n' 1-268, 10.3.81, pp.2-30.






























































































Quest ions at 
Quest ion T ime 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Comm i ss i on 329 495 510 472 464 456 584 509 713
Counc i 1 132 217 238 214 193 223 283 198 205
Foreign Ministers 41 92 102 119 111 112 138 154 153
Total 502 804 850 805 768 791 1025 861 1071





























































































Year N° of Sessions N° of Days No of Hours
1977 13 60 362
1978 12 58 376
1979 11 52 354
1980 14 64 430
1981 13 62 439




























































































Question Tims. Thirdly, the fact that, of the 410 
newly-e le ct ed  MEPs, only 125 held mandates in their 
national parliaments^®®^ meant that over two-thirds of 
the members had no other means, in terms of individual 
rights, of questioning the Commission and the Council. 
Fourthly, only 77 members of the new parliament had 
served in the old, thus reducing the general 
institutional knowledge about the procedure and its 
intended purpose. A fifth indirect effect on Question 
Time was the new Parliament's political ambition, 
particularly in terms of seeking out and con solidating 
new powers. In the eyes of many new parliamentarians, 
Question Time was an old and increasingly decrepit 
procedure, an exotic import, from an alien political 
system, largely the preserve of a few nationalities, and 
whose purpose had never been more than vaguely defined.
ii) The 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration
The Declaration on European Union, signed by the 
ten heads of state and government on 19 June 1983,(91) 
touched upon the Question Time procedure in two ways. 
First of all, the declaration confirmed (Article 2.3.2) 
that the Parliament should debate all matters relevant 
to European Union, including European Political 
Cooperation. Secondly, the Declaration asserted that 
the Commission and the Council would, according to their 
respective competences, reply to Parliament's written 
and oral questions. (Article 2.3.3.). The Treaties 
already foresaw such an obligation on the part of the 
Commission, and the Council had fully participated in 
the procedure since the outset. The Stuttgart Solemn 
Declaration was therefore no more than a formalisation 
of the preceding status quo; a consolidation, rather 
than an extension. The Question Time procedure was, 
meanwhile, becoming steadily more moribund.
iii) The 1985-1986 Reforms
The catalyst for reform came in the form of a motion 
for a r e s o lut ion<90 1 2 > , tabled by Mr ROGALLA (SOC/D) to 
the November, 1984, plenary session. The motion called 
for the introduction of an additional Question Time on 
topical matters, "as a means of st rengthening the 
supervisory powers of the directly-elected Members of 
Parliament." Mr ROGALLA was dismissive of the old-style 
Quest ion Time;
(90) Forg i ng Ahead , 1st edition, op.cit., p.35.





























































































"... in the past Question Time has consisted largely 
of reading out prepared opinions and statements and 
has very rarely served to convey to the people of 
Europe an idea of the interaction between the 
Community institutions or of the state of progress 
of the Co mmunity's d e v e l o p m e n t ."(93)
But he clearly didn't object to the principle. His 
idea was that;
"... this additional Question Time should take the 
form of a free debate, chaired by the President of 
Parliament, in which Members of the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers would speak briefly to questions 
concerning the state of progress of European 
un i f i ca t i o n ."( 94 )
The motion was referred by the plenary to the 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Petitions for 
consideration. At its 18 and 19 December 1984 meeting, 
the Committee decided on an overhaul of all of the Rules 
of Procedure relating to parliamentary questions, and 
appointed Mrs. DURY (SOC/B) as rapporteur.
Before the Committee's work had properly got under 
way, an irritated Mr NEWTON DUNN (ED/UK) proposed an 
amendment to the Annex II guidelines to the Rules of 
Procedure to the March, 1985 p l e n a r y . 0 5 )  He pointed 
out that;
"... in the February 1985 Plenary, the first twelve 
questions to the commission had already been carried 
over from three previous plenaries in November, 
December and January. The following nine questions 
had been carried over from two previous plenaries. 
This made it almost impossible for Members to cross 
examine the Commission on fresh and topical 
m a t t e r s . ” (96)
Mr NEWTON DUNN'S amendment sought to limit the 
carrying-over of un-answered questions to one time only. 
This proposal was also referred to the Committee on the 
Rules of Procedure and Petitions for its consideration.
Work proceeded very slowly, taking two years from 
the date of the deposition of Mr ROGALLA's original 
motion for a resolution. Mrs DURY's r e p o r t ^ 7 ' was
TWT) Ibid.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Doc . 2-1670/84
(96) Ibid.
(97) Doc . A 2 - 1 35/86




























































































finally adopted on 13 November 1986^®®'. The Committee 
had taken no less than eight m e e t i n g s ^ " )  spread over 
those two years, to debate and adopt its report. There 
was an obvious reason for this delay. In February, 
19 8 6 ( 10°), the Single European Act was adopted. The 
new procedures established by the Act - particularly 
the cooperation and assent procedures - entailed a 
wholesale revision of Parliament's Rules of Procedure. 
Not surprisingly, reform of an old and increasingly 
moribund procedure took second place.
That the procedure was becoming increasingly 
moribund was now beyond d o u b t . The Committee's report 
argued that Question Time had;
"... signally failed to fulfil the function for 
which it was originally created. Questions are out- 
of-date by the time they come into plenary, 
question time itself is poorly attended by both 
members and journalists and the answers given are 
frequently uninformative or unsatisfactory. 
Furthermore, the number of questions dealt with 
during question time is very smaI I .“(101}
On the other hand, the report had a clear view of 
the advantages of the procedure;
"Question time offers virtually the only 
opportunity for private Members to bring individual 
initiatives to plenary without passing through the 
filtering mechanism of committees, political groups 
or the Enlarged Bureau and at the same time offers 
members a means of showing their constituents that 
they are active on their behalf ...
In addition, the right to put supplementary 
questions offers a possibility for unscripted 
dialogue which is not otherwise a major feature of 
Parliament's proceedings, and possibly an 
op portunity for extracting a concession or an 
undertaking from a Commissioner or Minister . "f1 )
These advantages, it will be noted, accrued to the 
individual member, the backbencher, rather than the 
Parliament as a whole. Natural inertia, together with 
the rights of the backbencher, were becoming powerful 
allies against fundamental reform. The underlying 
attitude was that, although the procedure had its 
shortcomings, it was, from the backbenchers' point of 
view, one of the few untrammelled rights still 
ava i I ab I e to t h e m .
7 W 5  0 . J . , 13.11.86, N° 2-345 , p.140.
(99) 26-27 February, 22-23 May, 23-24 September and 18-19
November 1985; 25-26 February, 17-18 June, 24-25 June,
and 13-14 October 1986.
(100) O.J., 29.6.87, N° L 169.
(101) Doc. A2-135/86, p.22.




























































































A similar attitude was discernible in the 
Committee's deliberations on Rule 43, relating to Oral 
Questions Without Debate. Here, too, any Member could 
table a question on a specific matter;
"The original purpose of this Rule was to enable 
ba ck benchers to raise specific points and to obtain 
an answer. With the introduction of Question Time 
it may be argued that it has been superseded ..."(103)
Rule 43 w a s ;
"... a survival from a more leisurely era when 
Pa rl iament's agenda was less crowded than today.
Owing to the ever increasing pressure on 
Pa rl iament's agenda, the enlarged Bureau clearly 
feels that it can no longer accede to requests by 
individual Members for questions on specific, 
perhaps local or technical matters which, having 
regard to the Rule's provisions on speaking time, 
may well take up 20 or 30 minutes of Parliament's 
time. "(104)
In other words, a combination of the introduction 
of Qu estion Time and the Enlarged Bureau's constant 
tendency to avoid the procedure had made it redundant.
Yet the Committee did not propose any amendment to the 
Rules of Procedure, preferring to leave the individual 
Mem ber's increasingly academic rights untouched, 
knowing that the Enlarged Bureau would inevitably 
divert any such questions to Question T i m e ^ 103 4 0 5  106'. It 
was because of this jealous defensiveness of 
backbenchers' rights (itself a reaction to the 
increasing centralisation of power in the political 
groups and the Enlarged Bureau) that, despite the 
Committ ee' s belief that Question Time was in need of 
"fundamental ref o r m " (1 3 6 ), no such fundamental reform 
was proposed.
(103) Ibid. , p .18.
(104) Ibid., p . 21 .
(105) The right still exists in the current Rules of Procedure, 
under Rule 59.




























































































As part of her research, the rapporteur visited the 
House of Commons (March 1985), and her findings were 
annexed to the Committee's r eport^10 7  108). The underlying 
assumption of the Committee's deliberations was that 
Question Time in the European Parliament could be as 
much of a success as the House of Commons model itself;
“ If it is to attract the interest of journalists and 
the public, question time needs to be more snappy 
and the Vice-Pre si den ts  must be invited to apply the 
guidelines contained in Annex II to the Rules of 
Procedure more strictly and uniformly. Your 
rapporteur noted that in the House of Commons 20-25 
questions are answered orally during the 55 minutes 
of each day's question time, whereas In the European 
Parliament in the course of one and a half hours of 
questions to the Commission the maximum number of 
questions answered in the reference period chosen 
(January 1984 - September 1985) was 16 but that in 
January 1985 Parliament got through only 6 
questions. The result is a large backlog ...
...Another observation made by your rapporteur 
during her visit to the House of Commons was that 
all the questions tabled for a given day's question 
time were addressed to a single ministry only and 
therefore were inter-related in their subject 
matter. This is not the case at present in the 
European parliament where any subject may be raised 
at any question time. This of course is a logical 
consequence of the practice of listing questions in 
the order in which they are tabled. •• C10 8)
Mrs DURY identified two factors which, in her 
opinion, had contributed, inter alia to the procedure's 
lack of success. Both prob I e m s , it will be noted, had 
been present from the very beginning.
"The Commissioner or Minister appearing before 
Parliament is not always the person responsible for 
the subject of the question. This factor clearly 
reduces the value of supplementary questions, since 
he may quite simply not know the answer or be unable 
to give an undertaking...
(107) Ibid., ArTnex I, pp. 30-32.




























































































"As regards questions to the Council and the 
Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, 
owing to the nature of those bodies it is unusual 
for a supplementary question to elicit any 
information not already included in the min ister's 
prepared reply or otherwise publicly available ... “ (109)
Possible solutions were mooted, and some acted 
upon. With regard to the attendance of appropriate 
Comm is sio ne rs  or Ministers, for example, the rapporteur 
felt that the problem could be partly diminished if, 
first, more use were made of the existing provisions 
for grouping related questions and, second, provision 
for Question Times in Committee were established.
The rapporteur recommended two changes to the Rules 
which were ultimately adopted by plenary. The first, 
introduction of the possibility for Question Times in 
Committee, was clearly regarded as something of a 
panacea at the time, and is dealt with in section (v) 
below. The second, abolition of the right to carry 
unan swered questions over from one plenary to the next, 
had formed the basis of Mr NEWTON D U N N ’s proposed 
amendment. He had suggested that questions should be 
carried over once only, but the Committee decided to 
abolish the carry-over procedure altogether, hence 
doing away in one fell swoop with the problem of 
backlog, and ensuring that all questions would be 
recently tabled, if not topical.
For the rest, the Committee was obliged to 
recognise that the problem lay not so much with the 
content of the Rules, as with their application;
“The Committee considers that adequate rules on 
grouping and on suppIementaries already exist. The 
problem is that they are not u s e d . " (1 1 0 )
(165 ) Ibid. , pp\ 22-23.




























































































Apart, therefore, from the two changes mentioned 
above, the Committee decided not to propose any major 
amendments to the Rules, but rather to make a series of 
rec ommendations contained in a motion for a 
r e s o I u t i o n (11 1 ) . There were just three
recommendations: that the guidelines on admissibility
should be applied more strictly; that the President 
should use his powers to group related questions; and 
that the Vice -Pr esi de nts  should be stricter in their 
interpretation of the admissibility of supplementary 
questions when presiding in plenary. Lastly, the 
resolution invited the Commission and the Council to be 
more concise in their replies.
The way in which Parliament debated and adopted the 
report was somehow symptomatic of the whole 
problématique. After four hours of voting on eight 
reports on employment pol i c y ^ 1 1 2  134', there was no time 
left for debate on Mrs DURY's report. Her own 
introductory speech was cut short, and Commissioner 
SUTHERLAND was urged to be as brief as possible in his 
reply. The rapporteur described how she had had to 
“ ... strike a balance between the rights of individual 
Members, the demands and prerogatives of the political 
groups and Parliament's operating r e q u i r e m e n t s " ^ 1 3 '. 
The result was, in her own words, a “ lowest common 
denominator," but one that had enjoyed the unanimous 
support of the Rules Committee - no mean achievement.
Commissioner Sutherland recognised these 
constraints in his reply.
"We can well understand that here as in other areas 
of procedural reform a balance has to be kept 
between efficiency on the one hand and the rights 
of the individual Members on the other. Indeed, 
questions are par excellence the domain of the 
individual M e m b e r . Be therefore understand that 
the report is a compromise representing a useful 
tidying up job, which will provide some 
streamlining of the various procedures for 
parliamentary questions. I would be less than 
honest if I did not say that it is something that 
needs reform and needs to be changed in terms of 
efficiency. Above all, the agenda will no longer 
be clogged with long outdated questions. This 
would be a great improve men t.“ (1143
(111) Doc. A 2 - 1 35/86, p.15. O.J., 15.12.86, N° C
322/174.
(112) O.J., 11.11.86, N° 2-345, pp 71-72.
( 1 1 3 ) I b i d . ,  p . 7 1 .




























































































Voting on the report itself was preceded by a 
procedural w r a n g l e ^ ' ® ) .
Two other aspects of the DURY report may be noted. 
First, a statistical study was undertaken in relation to 
the report. However, the period studied (January 1984 - 
September 1985) and the level of ag gregation involved 
proved little other than that the numbers of questions 
to the Commission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers 
were on the in cre as e(11® ) . Second, in addition to Rule 
43 (Questions without debate), the DURY report 
identified another dormant "survival from a more 
leisurely era". This was Rule 45, which provided for a 
debate following Question Time on "a specific matter of 
general and topical interest." A debate of this kind, 
Mrs DURY reported, might "be envisaged where a question 
raises a topical matter of extreme importance, or where 
the answer of the institution repying is so inadequate 
or unsat is fac to ry  as to justify Parliament's pursuing 
the matter in this w a y . “ (1 1 7 ) The Rule had not been 
used “for some considerable time." Nevertheless, she 
recommended "its retention as a valuable instrument 
enabling Parliament to react immediately to an 
unsa tisfactory a n s w e r .“ (11® )
A banal reason for the current redundancy of this 
Rule has much to do with the 'slot' traditionally 
allotted to Question Time to the Commission in 
Parl iament's agenda. Since it is usually held at the 
end of the Parliamentary day, no services - par ti cularly 
interpretation - would be available were a request for a 
debate to be held. It would appear that a tacit 
agreement has been reached between at least the larger 
political groups, probably In view of the ever- 
increasing pressure on Parliament's agenda, that such 
requests will not be made. Such an agreement could not 
exclude the possibility of seven members calling for a 
debate, and it is a moot point as to what would then 
occur. Ac cording to Rule 45, or Rule 61 as it now is, 
“the decision as to whether to hold a debate on request 
shall be taken by the President only at the close of 
Question Time and shall not be subject to debate." 
Presumably, faced with an impending absence of 
interpretation, a President would have no choice but to 
refuse. Of course, the 'slot' for Question Time could 
be changed. In the meantime, Rule 61 co ntinues to hover 
ethereally in the Rules of Procedure, as a sort of very 
distant sword of Damocles. 15678
(115) 0 . J . , 13.11.86, N ° 2-345, p p . 140-141.
(116) Doc. A2-1 35/86, p . 23 and Annex III.
(117) Ib id., p . 19.




























































































iv) 1979-1989; S t a t i s t i c s (1 1 9 >
In his 1979 study of Question T l m e ( 12°) Cohen took 
one plenary session (April) in each year from 1976 to 
1979, and examined in greater detail the exact nature of 
parliamentarians' participation. His findings, partly 
considered in Section IV, are easy to summarise;
British members tabled the most questions and asked the 
most su pplementary questions.
This section reports on a similar analysis of 
Qu estion Times from 1979 to 1989. May was chosen as a 
'typical' month, there being no special processes, such 
as the debates and votes on, for example, the 
Co mm ission's programme (January), agricultural prices 
(April), or the budget (October, December).
The results of the survey are summarised in tables 
... . Cohen found it instructive to look not only at
the number of questions tabled in advance, but also at 
the number of supplementary questions asked during the 
procedure itself. <1 2 1  12> The current study goes one step 
further by breaking down tabled and supplementary 
questions according to the institution to which they 
were addressed (see tables 4 to 12).
The most obvious and important finding is that 
British members continued to dominate the procedure; 
they tabled by far the most questions and asked more 
supp I ementaries than any other national grouping.
Several reasons for this prevalence have already been 
discussed in Section IV. Another, perhaps the most 
important, was enunciated by Mrs DURY in the 1986 
debate;
"I must add - and do so without fear of 
contradiction - that when we ask the Commission 
questions, it is generally to show our constituents 
that we are concerning ourselves with their problems 
or with certain categories of problems ...” (122)
Few would argue that British members are particularly 
constituency conscious. The only way, apart from a 
passing reference in a speech, that a backbencher can 
manifest active concern for his constituency in plenary 
is to table a question to Question Time and ask a 
supplementary. Exactly the same principle applies to
(119) U r Paolo Cor t i, stagiaire in the Secretariat 
General of the Comm i ss i on of the European 
Co mmunities from October 1989 to February 1990, 
researched and compiled the statistical data and 
tables in Section V (iv).
(120) Cohen, op.cit., pp . 51-55.
(121) Ibid.




























































































the even more Impressive participation of Irish members 
(see below). As noted in Section IV, British members 
tend to bunch their s u p p I e m e n t a r i e s , perhaps because of 
teamwork, but most probably because more of them tend to 
be in the Chamber and are ready to engage in 
Westm ins te r-s ty  I e k n o c k - a b o u t s . Lastly, Table 12 shows 
that, on average, a higher proportion of British members 
received oral replies to their questions. This implies 
better preparedness and/or a wi llingness to forego 
topicality in order to be sure of receiving an oral 
answer; almost the exact opposite of the Italian 
members' attitude (see below).
Between 1980 and 1984, French levels of 
particip at io n were high, second only to the British, 
tabling an average of 14.5 questions per session, though 
particip at io n in suppIementaries was lower. After 1985, 
however, French pa rliamentarians seemed suddenly to lose 
interest in the procedure, and the 1980 to 1984 average 
of 14.5 questions tabled was reduced to just 4.25 
thereafter. After 1984, indeed, 10 French questions 
were tabled to Foreign Ministers, and just 4 (2 in 1985 
and 1988) to the Council. Clearly, the new 1984 intake 
of French members was less than enamoured of the 
procedure, and there would appear to have been a 
collective judgement that questions to the Council and 
EPC were not worthwhile. There was a similar decline in 
the number of French suppIementaries asked, from a high 
of 14 in 1982 to just 1 in 1987 and none at all in 1988. 
This decline is more easily explained; fewer questions 
were being tabled by French members, so fewer were 
present in the chamber to ask s u p p I e m e n t a r i e s .
Since its arrival in 1981, the Greek contingent, 
with just 24 members, has tabled a disp ro por tio na tel y 
high number of questions, both overall (4 in 1981, 3 in 
1982, and thereafter an average of 12, second only to 
the number tabled by British members), and particularly 
with regard to EPC, where Greek members tabled an 
average of over 3 questions per session (slightly more 
than British members). Some of this high rate of 
activity can be explained by the enthusiastic 
particip at io n of individual members - Mr EPHEREMIDIS 
(COM) and ALAVANOS (COM) have been outstandi ng  - but a 
more general explanation is the particular and 
continuing Greek interest in the Co mmunity's relations 
with certain Me diterranean and Baltic States. Greek 
parliame nt ar ian s were also di sproportionately 
represented among supplementary questions where, it 
should be borne in mind, members are restricted to 
asking one su pplementary per question. Given the 
relatively small size of the Greek contingent, such 




























































































The record of pa rticipation of the Irish contingent, 
with just 15 members, is similarly impressive, with an 
average of 7 questions tabled per session. Here, the 
high pa rticipation rate can most probably be explained 
by the constituency principle referred to above.
Other smaller national contingents with above- 
average partici pat io n in both tabled questions and 
supp I ementaries were Denmark, with 16 members and an 
average of 4.5 questions tabled, and Belgium, with 24 
and 6.5 respectively. Since its arrival in January, 
1986, the Spanish contingent has been fairly we I I- 
represented (6 questions tabled in 1986, 8 in 1987, 12 
in 1988). However, many of the questioners were members 
of the Partido Popular, and hence of the European 
Democratic Group, and it could be supposed that some of 
the questioning fervour of British Conservative members 
had rubbed off on their Spanish colleagues. It remains 
to be seen whether, now that the Partido Popular has 
left the EDG for the European People's Party, Spanish 
participation will continue at such a level.
Two of the larger national groupings exhibited very 
low levels of participation. The 81 German members 
between them tabled an average of 5.5 questions and 
demonstrated an equivalent level of particip at ion  in 
supplementary questioning. The 81 Italian members 
boasted an even lower average, 4.5, of questions tabled, 
and had not asked a single supplementary question since 
1982, which would seem to suggest that the few Italian 
members who used the procedure regarded it exclusively 
as an express answering machine.
Lastly, it should be noted that the Portuguese 
contingent (24 members) had, since 1986, tabled a steady 
trickle of 1 or 2 questions per session, and that the 
Luxembourg contingent, with just 6 members, had 
completely abstained from the procedure.
Weighted and absolute pa rticipation by political 
group was also examined (statistics not shown here). 
Membership of political group was, it was found, a poor 
explanatory factor, and relative pa rticipation levels 
could be almost entirely explained by reference to 
their composition by national groupings. Hence, a 
relatively high 'score' for the Socialist Group could be 
largely explained by its contingent of British Labour 
members, and a relatively low 'score' for the EPP Group 
by the absence of any British members. A very high 
score for the EDG could obviously be explained by the 
large number of British Conservative members within it. 
Similarly, a high 'score' for the EDA Group could be 
explained by the large number of Irish Fianna Fail 
members it contained together with the presence of Mrs 
EWING, the sole Scottish Nationalist M E P , and a 




























































































In conclusion, relative levels of partici pa tio n 
could be almost entirely explained by na tionality and, 
with a few ex ce ptions (Spanish members of the EDG, for 
example), group membership was almost completely 
irrelevant. As to the findings themselves, 
nationalities could clearly be divided into those less 
or more interested in the procedure, with some losing 
(e.g., France) and some gaining (e.g., Greece) interest 
over the years under study. If the British have 
continued to dominate the procedure overall, the Greeks 
have come to play an equally important role with regard 
to E P C , and smaller Member States - Belgium, Denmark, 
and Ireland - have made important overall contributions. 
However, three of the four largest co ntingents - the 
French, Germans and Italians - have parti ci pat ed  only 
minimally. Overall participation is very imbalanced, 
and the single most important explanatory factor 
identified is, quite simply, the electoral system used.
v) Question Time in Committee
According to the DURY report, the innovation of 
holding Question Times in Committee was first tried on 
an experimental basis in the Legal Affairs Committee in 
1978(123), and was thereafter "considered from time to 
time by other c o m m i t t e e s ."(123 2 4 ) In June 1985, British 
members of Pa rl iament's Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy called for the 
introduction of a regular Question Time in committee, 
devoted particularly to the current economic situation.
Following an exchange of letters between the 
Chairman of the committee, Dr SEAL, and President DELORS 
(June and September 1985), the Committee held its first 
Question Time in its 28-30 January 1986 meeting.
Perhaps also because President DELORS had previously 
been Chairman of the same Committee, the Commi ss ion 's  
attitude was open and positive. Nevertheless, the 
Commission did lay down a number of co nditions for the 
par ticipation of its officials. Questions were to be 
strictly factual and of a topical nature, and clearly 
related to the economic situation and in particular to 
current indicators. The Commission itself would decide 
on the admissibility of questions put to it, and there 
was a strict un derstanding that replies given by 
officials during such Question Times could not engage 
the Commission politically.
(123) PE 55.7T&7BUR.




























































































The first Question Time in Committee was preceded by 
a short debate during which members expressed their 
dissatisf act io n on several scores. For practical, 
procedural reasons (sufficient time for the Commission 
to judge the admissibility of questions, alert the 
appropriate officials and prepare its replies), Question 
Time was held late on the last day of the Committee's 
meeting which meant that it would invariably be ill- 
attended. But parliamentarians' more substantive 
ob je ctions related to the conditions laid down by the 
Commission. They were frustrated by the limitation to 
economic and monetary matters only, by the formal nature 
of proceedings, and by the explicit exclusion of 
political dialogue which was, in their view, the raison 
d'être of the procedure. All this having been said, 
par I i amentar i ans expressed some satisfaction at the 
informative outcome of the first Question T i m e . ^ 12®)
Frustrations came to the fore in the committee's 
second Question Time, (24-26 February 1986) when the 
Commission unilaterally ruled, using rights established 
by the exchange of letters, two questions inadmissible. 
Similar frustrations were vented at the third Question 
Time (19-21 March 1986), and no questions at all were 
tabled to the fourth and the fifth. In the meantime, Dr 
SEAL had written to the C o m m is s i o n ,(125 2 6 )asking if the 
scope of the procedure could not be extended, but in his 
r e p l y ^ 1 2 7 ) President DELORS was unforthcoming, 
stressing the exceptional nature of the procedure that 
had been agreed.
In a vague way, Pa rli amentarians hoped the DURY 
reforms would somehow overcome these frustrations. Mrs 
DURY's logic was clear. Question Time in Committee would 
give "... members an opportunity to cross-examine 
Members of the Commission and perhaps Ministers in a 
less formal way and outside the time constraints of 
Question Time in p I e n a r y .“<12 8 > She saw it as a way of 
guarantee ei ng the presence of the appropriate, 
competent, Commissioner or M in is t e r (1 2 9  130);
"We very often ask Co mmissioners questions on 
subjects which do not fall within their special 
field, whereupon they read replies prepared by their 
departments. We cannot obviously, expect the 
various Commissioners to be experts on everything. 
Often also, the answers that we receive are banal 
and lacking in substance. I call for us to be able 
to ask questions in committee of Co mmissioners who 
specialize in the relevant s u b j e c t s . "(130)
(125) Quest i ons related to the Group of Five, Sterling and ERM, 
the drop in petrol prices, and statistical information.
(126) February 1986:
(127) Apr i I 1986.
(128) Doc. A 2 - 1 35/86, p.27.
(129) Ibid, p .22.




























































































The result of the Rules Committee's del iberations 
was simple, to make provision in the Rules of Procedure 
for Co mm ittees to hold Question Times if they so wished, 
and Mrs D U R Y ’s report tabled an amendment accordingly. 
Though it amounted to nothing more than an admission of 
what had already been happening, it was presumably felt 
that explicit provision would somehow encourage 
Comm ittees to go ahead. The rapporteur had clearly been 
under pressure from the Commission not to go much 
further as Mr SUTHERLAND made clear in the plenary 
d e b a t e ;
"Question Time in committee has been the subject of 
much dicussion in your committee and indeed in the 
Commission. We are not at all opposed to the 
principle. Our concern has been to ensure a degree 
of flexibility. The text of the new Rule 102(a) now 
before the House seems entirely satisfactory in that 
regard. Under its umbrella the committees will no 
doubt work out their own arrangements with the 
Commission and that, of course, is exceI l e n t . 131 132)
The amendment adopted by the plenary could not have 
been more flexible;
"Question time may be held in committee if a 
committee so decides. Each committee shall decide 
its own rules for the conduct of question t i m e . " f 132)
In the event, no committee immediately took up the 
idea. In the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 
meanwhile, frustration at the Commission's rulings on 
admissibility was growing. The debate occ asi on ed by 
the adoption of the new rule led the Committee to 
conclude (February, 1987), that its interests could 
best be served by regularly inviting, and questioning, 
competent Commissioners. Question Time was left on the 
C o m m i t t e e ’s agenda for a while thereafter, but no more 
questions were tabled. Ultimately, the procedure was 
allowed to slip out of sight, forlorn and forgotten.
The Committee's decision showed up a fundamental 
flaw in the Question Time in Committee idea; political 
debate with the Commission can only ever take place at 
the level of the Commissioners. Question Time in 
Committee might be useful for the debate of technical 
matters not currently the subject of a Commission 
proposal, for example, and Commission officials can and 
frequently do give parliamentary committees off -the- 
record indications of the Commission's political 
position, but only a Commissioner can give political 
unde rtakings and take political stands. Realising 
this, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
has concentrated, very successfully, on regular 
exchanges with the seven Co mmissioners whose 
competences fall more or less frequently within its 
remit.
(131) Ibid., p . 72 .




























































































Until recently, it seemed that Question Time in 
Committee had become another anachronism in the 
Parliament's Rules of Procedure. In November, 1989, 
however, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Consumer Protection decided to replace the 
traditional item "follow-up to Parliament's opinions" on 
its agenda by Question Time to the Commission. In 
another exchange of letters, though this time at 
secretariat level, the Commission agreed to participate 
on the same terms and under the same conditions as had 
been listed in the 1985 SEAL-DELORS exchange of letters. 
Exactly the same sentiments of frustration were voiced 
by pa rl ia mentarians when, on the first occ asion that 
Question Time was held in the Committee, Commission 
officials reiterated the conditions under which they 
were to participate.
The new experiment had two advantages over its 
predecessor; first, questions were submitted in advance 
of the meeting, thus allowing the Commission more time 
to consider and prepare its responses and, second, the 
committee seemed implicitly to accept that there would 
be an inevitable trade-off between the degree of detail 
desired and the level of the official concerned. 
Notwithst and in g these immediate advantages, the 
procedure rapidly fell into disuse, and it remains to be 
seen whether it, too, will slip permanently off the 
agenda. Most probably it will be reactivated from time 
to time to deal with specific concerns.
It is probable, too, that the idea will surface 
sporadically in other Committees. For example, two 
British MEPs recently called for the introduction of a 
regular Question Time in the Committee on Development 
and Cooper a t i o n .(1 3 3 ) In reply to their questions the 
Committee Chairman, Mr SABY (SOC), was instructive, 
since he asked the MEPs to make use of another regular 
agenda item; "information from the Commission."
Thereby hangs the tale for, once shorn of the 
formality and atmosphere of the pa rliamentary chamber, 
Question Time amounts to little more than a detailed 
exchange (with a Commission official) by another name, 
and such detailed exchanges with Commission officials 
are in any case the very meat and drink of Committee 
meetings. Procedura I I y , there might be slight 
differences, but few advantages. Indeed, as the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee had learnt 
earlier, Commission officials could be actually more 
constrained by the Question Time procedure.
(133) Tn the Comm i 11 e e 's meeting of 27 and 28 February and 1





























































































vi) 1986 Onwards; the Balance Sheet
Even the procedure's best friends would have to 
admit that, if not actually down yet, Qu estion Time is 
constantly on the ropes, and likely to remain there.
Its precise role and exact relation to Parli am ent 's  
other qu estioning functions remain ill-defined. The 
procedure is disp ro po rti on ate ly  used by some 
nationalities, is generally poorly attended and poorly 
reported, and is poorly regarded by Pa rli ament's Bureau, 
which has transformed Question Time into a mov eable 
feast, with obvious knock-on effects for the good humour 
of the other institutions involved. Yet somehow, 
despite the ever-i nc rea si ng pressure on Par lia me nt' s 
plenary agenda, the procedure survives. It does so 
primarily by a thin, but extremely tough thread - the 
rights of the backbencher. (Short of co ntinuously 
raising points of order - a technique skillfully 
exploited by the Italian Radical MEP, Mr PANELLA, there 
are very few sure ways in which a member can have the 
floor to himself without going through the political 
groups. Question Time is one of those ways.) it is 
these rights which explain, to a consi de rabl e degree, 
why Mrs DURY's 1986 recommendations were never properly 
e n a c t e d .
The first recommendation was for stricter 
application of the guidelines governing admissibility, 
but it is not the Bureau, or Enlarged Bureau - 
corporate, collegiate bodies that can make unpopular 
decisions with relative impunity - that must decide on 
admissibility. This pleasure falls to the President - 
in reality, to the President's cabinet. Ruling a 
question inadmissible will rarely be a" popular act, and 
never for the backbencher who tabled it. it is not 
surprising, therefore, that negative rulings on 
admissibility are relatively infrequent.
The second recommendation was that the President 
should make more frequent use of the power conferred on 
him by the Rules to group questions according to 
subject. This power is used, but sparingly. Again, 
grouping questions is- a" potentially unpopular act as far 
as individual MEPs are concerned, since it will 
inevitably lessen the probability of other questions, 
tabled earlier, receiving an oral reply. The only 
system perceived to be entirely fair is to strictly 
follow the order in which questions were tabled. Not 
surprisingly, successive President's cabinets have 
generally tended to opt for this chronological system, 
its great advantage being that it is entirely 




























































































The third, final recommendation in the DURY Report
was ;
"that as a general rule the President should allow 
one su pplementary question from the questioner and 
one or at most two su pplémentaires put by a Member 
belonging preferably to a different political group 
and/or Member State from the author of the main 
question; recalls that supplementary questions must 
be concise and interrogatory in form and suggests 
that their duration should not exceed 30 
seconds.''^1-*4 )
The first part of the recommendation is slightly 
puzzling, since the Rules already forbade more than one 
su pplementary per question per member, and it must be 
assumed that Presidents had not been applying the Rule 
strictly enough. It has certainly been respected 
since. As to the number, spread, and content of 
s uppIementarie s , rulings from the Chair continue to 
differ considerably, and it is clear why this should be 
so. There are 14 Vice-Pres id ent s of the Parliament, 
and these change every two and a half years. Not 
surprisingly, styles and attitudes to admissibility 
differ considerably. Furthermore, a very strict 
application of the Rules is not in the procedure's best 
interests. The best Chairmen, like the best football 
and rugby referees, are those who, so to speak, 
judiciously apply the “advantage rule" (allowing play 
to continue after a foul has continued to see if an 
advantage develops), ensuring a continuous flow of 
debate .
Another perceived constraint on the flow of debate 
and, equally importantly, on the number of questions 
that could be answered orally, was the length of the 
institutions' replies, hence the invitation to the 
Commission, Council and Foreign Mi nisters to ensure 
that "answers are concise and relevant to the subject 
of the q u e s t i o n ."(134 3 5 ) In fact, the Council and the 
Foreign Ministers were more likely to be criticised for 
making their answers too short; the Commission was the 
sinner Parliament chiefly had in mind. The 
Co mm ission's tendency to give inordinately lengthy 
replies is largely explained by the system under which 
replies are prepared. Co mmissioners are in the hands 
of their services, and where an over-zealous 
administrator in a Directorate General has indulged in 
too much detail, hierarchical superiors are unlikely to 
make dramatic alterations. The length of replies to 
supp I e m e n t a r ies depend very much on the id io s y n c r a c ies 
of individual Commissioners. Here, there is an 
element of having the cake and eating it too in 
Parliament's criticisms; a detailed answer can





























































































simult an eou sl y please the questioner and displease a 
parli ame nt ari an  whose question has not yet been reached. 
Lastly, there has been a traditional, respectful 
timidity on the part of Parliament's Vi ce- Presidents, so 
that loquacious Co mmissioners are rarely called to order 
or told to cut their answers short.
The DURY Report recognised the link between delays 
in providing written answers and the use of Question 
Time as an "express s e r v i c e ” (see Section V.iv)). It 
called upon the institutions to appeal to the criteria 
of ad missibility more frequently, and “to respect the 
time limits for replies to written questions contained 
in Rule 46(3) . " 0  36)
Conve rsa ti ons  with the institutions' services reveal 
three criticisms of these recommendations. First, 
applicat io n of Parliament's Rules of Procedure must 
primarily be a matter for the Parliament itself. Thus, 
to call upon the other Institutions to apply the 
Pariament's criteria regarding admissibility is to 'pass 
the buck". On the other hand, given the unpopu la rit y of 
negative rulings on admissibility, it is under st and ab le 
that Pa rl iament's services prefer to err on the liberal 
side.
Second, the deadline of one month foreseen in Rue 
46(3) (now Rule 62.) was un ila terally imposed by the 
Parliament and, given the sheer volume of questions 
tabled (see Table I), has become Increasingly 
unreaI i st i c .
Third, because of the different nature of the 
writt en question procedure and, in particular, the need 
for translation and collegiate approval by the 
Commission or the Council, it is impossible for written 
replies to be provided more quickly than answers in 
Question Time. In other words, the written question 
procedure could never be speeded up su fficiently to 
deter MEPs from 'misusing' the Question Time procedure 
as an express service.
Two additional ob ser vations can be made. First, the 
sanction for not respecting the time limit foreseen in 
Rule 46(3) - publication in the OJ - is now so 
commonplace that it is not really a sanction at all. 
Second, the statistics in Section V.iv) would seem to 
suggest that misuse of this sort is actually restricted 
to a few MEPs of a few nationalities. In any case, 
given that written answers will never be provided 
quicker, it is a moot point as to whether this practice 





























































































As was observed earlier, the procedure would 
appear to be on the ropes, and the balance sheet 
suggests a poor prognosis. The procedure's purpose 
remains ill-defined, and it overlaps co nfusingly with 
others. It is heavily dependent on the qualitative 
cooperation of the other institutions. it necessarily 
lacks a party political dimension, so that disputes take 
place on a neutral, vertical, inter-institutionaI basis, 
rather than the horizontal, adversarial method of the 
Westminster model its founders sought to emulate. The 
need for interpretation, lengthy replies or 
supplementary questions, differing interpretations from 
the Chair, and different political cultures all slow the 
pace. Parliament's increasing powers in other areas 
have led to an erosion in the procedure's relative 
importance. Increasing pressure on the Parliamentary 
agenda, the procedure's sui generis independence from 
the Enlarged Bureau and i t s relative un imp ortance have 
meant that it is the first to be switched about when 
changes to the agenda occur. The procedure remains 
alien to several national groupings in the Parliament, 
and they, together with most journalists, largely shun 
it. Lastly, because of procedural inertia and the 
political costs involved, the procedure remains 
stubbornly inflexible and closed to major change. Many 
of those political costs would invove thwarting the 
fi er cely-defended interests of backbenchers emanating 
chiefly from those national groupings culturally 
familiar with such procedures and/or elected under some 
sort of const it ue nc y- bas ed  system.
'Across the wire the electric message came,
"He is no different, he is much the s a m e ,"'(137)
Will the lines quoted above be Just as apt in the 
year 2000 as they are in 1990? The end of this year 
will see an intergovernmental conference consider 
further amendments to the Treaties. These will most 
probably have far-reaching repercussions on Parliament's 
powers and procedure, necessitating some sort of 
revision of the Rules of Procedure in 1991. Will this 
revision provide an opportunity to reform the Question 
Time procedure and, if so, what sort of reforms might 
usefully be considered? Or will it once again be pushed 
to the side, as it was during the 1986 reforms?
(137) Apocrypha I Iy attributed to Alfred Austin, one 
time British poet laureate, on the state of 




























































































T A B L E  F O U R
O r a l  Q u e s t i o n s  t a b l e d  t o a l l  t h r e e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  by y e a r *
Year T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 68 Oh: 29 , FR : 16 , B : 5 , I R E : 5 ,  I T : 5 ,  IML:5, D : 2 ,
DK: 1.
1961 70 Oh: 3 1 , ER: 19,  0: * * ,  GR:**, I T : * . ,  D h : 3 ,  I R E : 3 ,
D : 2 .
1962 62 Uh: 2 7 , FR : 10 , I  RE : 7 , Dh : 5 , B : *., 0 : 3 ,  GR:3,
NL: 2 ,  I T : 1 .
1983 85 Oh: 2 5 , FR : 16,  D : 1 2 ,  GR: 11 ,  I R E : 7 ,  D h : 6 ,
I T : * . ,  8 : 3 ,  NL: 1.
198** 72 Oh: 2<*, B : 11,  FR : 11,  0 : 9 ,  GR: 7,  Dh:* . ,  I R E : 3 ,
NL: 2 ,  I T : 1 .
1985 85 Oh: 21 , IRE : 16,  GR : 1 *t, B : 1 0 ,  I T : 1 0 ,  Dh : 8 ,
FR: 8 ,  0 : 7 .
1986 63 O h : 18, GR : 13 , IRE : 9 ,  N L : 6 ,  S P : 6 ,  D : 5 ,  Dh:* . ,  
B: 3 ,  I T : 3 ,  F R : 1 ,  P : 1 .
1987 81 O h : 19, GR: 1 1 ,  I R E : 8 ,  I T : 8 ,  N L : 8 ,  S P : 8 ,  B : 6 ,  
Dh:* . ,  D:* . ,  F R : 3 ,  P : 2 .
1988 90 Oh: 2 7 , GR: 1 6 ,  B : 1 2 ,  S P : 1 2 ,  D h : 5 ,  F R : 5 ,
I R E : 5,  D:* . ,  I T : * . ,  N L : 3 ,  P : 2 .
•QJ•H« i n  May o n l y
TABLE EIUE
□ r a l  Q u e s t i o n s  t a b l e d t o t h e  Commission,  by y e a r *
Year T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 37 O h : 18, FR : 8 , NL:* . ,  I T : 3 ,  B : 2 ,  Dh : 1 , D : 1 .
1981 *.7 Oh : 2 0 , FR : 1 3 , I T : * . ,  D h : 3 ,  GR: 3,  I R E : 2 ,  B : 1 ,
D: 1.
1982 ** 3 O h : 19, FR: 7 , Dh: 5 , I R E : 5 ,  B : 2 ,  D : 2 ,  GR: 1,
I T  : 1 , NL: 1 .
1983 52 U h : 19, FR: 10 , IRE : 7 , D : 5 ,  GR: 5,  D h : 3 ,  I T : 2 ,
B: 1.
198*. 39 Uh: 1*., FR : 6 , B : 5 , D : 5 ,  GR:*. ,  I R E : 2 ,  D h : 1 ,
I T  : 1 , NL: 1 .
19B5 <*6 Uh: 1*., IRE : 7 , FR : 6 , I T : 6 ,  GR: 5,  B:* . ,  D h : 3 ,
D : 3 .
1986 37 IRE : 7 , Uh : 7 , Dh:* . ,  D:*. ,  GR:*. ,  SP:* . ,  I T : 2 ,  
NL: 2 , B : 1 , F R : 1 ,  P : 1 .
1987 53 U h : 10, GR : 8 , IRE : 7 , S P : 5 ,  Dh:* . ,  D : *., I T : * . ,  
NL:* . ,  FR : 3 , B : 2 ,  P : 2 .
1988 6 6 U h : 19, GR : 9 ,  SP : 9 , B : 8 ,  D:* . ,  I R E : * . ,  D h : 3 ,
FR: 3 ,  IRE : 3 ,  N L : 2 ,  P : 2 .



























































































T A B L E  S I X
O r a l  Q u e s t i o n s  t a b l e d  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  by y e a r *
Ye ar T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 25 UK : 8 ,  FR: 7 ,  B : 3 ,  I R E : 3 ,  I T : 2 ,  D : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1981 19 UK: 9 ,  FR: 6 ,  B : 2 ,  0 : 1 ,  GR:1.
1982 11 UK : 5 ,  FR: 2 ,  I R E : 2 ,  B : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1983 21 D : 6 ,  FR: 5 ,  GR: 3,  UK: 3 ,  DK: 2 ,  B : 1 ,  I T : 1 .
1984 19 UK : 7 ,  B: A , D : 3 ,  F R : 3 ,  DK: 1 ,  GR: 1.
1985 32 IRE : 8 ,  GR: 5 ,  UK: 5 ,  B: A , DK: 3 ,  I T : 3 ,  D : 2 ,
F R : 2 .
1986 23 UK : 7 ,  GR: 6 ,  l \ IL:3,  I R E : 2 ,  S P : 2 ,  B : 1 ,  0 : 1 ,
I T :  1.
1987 16 UK : 7 ,  IML : 3 ,  S P : 2 ,  B : 1 ,  GR: 1,  I RE:  1,  I T :  1.
1988 17 GR: A , UK : 4 ,  B : 2 ,  F R : 2 ,  S P : 2 ,  DK: 1 ,  I R E : 1 ,
I T :  1.
•QJ•H* i n  May □ n l y
TABLE SEUEN
O r a l  Q u e s t i o n s  t a b l e d  t o  EPC, by y e a r *
Year T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 5 UK : 3 ,  FR: 1.
1981 5 UK : 2 ,  B: 1,  I R E : 1 .
1982 8 UK : 3 ,  GR: 2 ,  B : 1 ,  0 : 1 ,  F R : 1 .
1983 12 GR: 3 ,  UK : 3 ,  B : 1 ,  DK: 1 ,  0 : 1 ,  F R : 1 ,  l t : 1 ,  NL : 1
■JCOcnr- 13 UK : 3 ,  B : 2 ,  D K: 2 ,  GR: 2,  F R : 2 ,  D : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1985 1A GR: A , B: 2 ,  DK: 2 ,  D : 2 ,  UK: 2,  I R E : 1 ,  I T : 1 .
1986 10 UK : A , GR: 3 ,  B : 1 ,  I R E : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1987 12 B : 3 ,  I T  : 3 ,  GR: 2,  UK: 2 ,  NL: 1,  S P : 1 .
1988 12 UK : A , GR: 3 ,  B : 2 ,  DK: 1, N L : 1 ,  S P : 1 .




























































































T A B L E  E I G H T
T o t a l  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  t a  a l l  t h r e e  i n s t i t u t i o n s *
Year T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1960 41 UK : 2 6 , NL: 7 ,  D : 4 ,  I T : 2 ,  DK: 1, F R : 1 .
1981 71 UK : 4 5, D : 9 ,  FR: 7 ,  N L : 6 ,  B : 2 ,  GR: 1,  I T : 1 .
1982 SB UK : 2*1, FR: 14,  D : 1 1,  I T : 3 ,  D K: 2 ,  B : 1 ,  GR: 1,
I R E : 1.
1983 5B UK:2 1 , D : 10,  GR: 8 ,  F R : 5 ,  D K: 4 ,  N L : 2 .
1984 33 UK : 2D, FR: 4 ,  B : 3 ,  D : 2 ,  GR: 2,  N L : 2 .
1985 Ui U K : 17, FR: 9 ,  IRE : 7 ,  D : 4 ,  B : 1 ,  D K: 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1986 3? U K : 16, D: 6 ,  IRE : 6 ,  GR:4,  NL: 3 ,  B : 1 ,  F R : 1 .
1987 38 UK:2 1 , B : 5 ,  GR: 5 ,  D : 3 ,  D K: 1 ,  F R : 1 ,  P : 1 ,  SP:1
1988 Ua UK : 2 2 , IRE : 4 ,  B: 3 ,  D : 3 ,  GR: 3,  D K: 2 ,  N L : 2 ,
SP: 1.
♦Hay o n l y ,  and n o t  i n c l u d i n g  a u t h o r s '  s u p p l e m e n t a r i e s
TABLE NINE
T o t a l  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  t o  t h s  Commission*
Ye ar T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 20 UK : 15,  NL: 3 ,  DK: 1,  F R : 1 .
1981 27 UK : 16,  FR: 5 ,  D : 2 ,  N L : 2 ,  GR: 1,  I T : 1 .
1982 27 UK : 15,  D : 7 ,  F R : 3 ,  DK: 1,  I R E : 1 .
1983 25 U K : 12,  FR: 5 ,  GR: 4,  D : 2 ,  N L : 2 .
1984 20 UK: 12,  B : 2 ,  F R : 2 ,  GR: 2,  D : 1 ,  NL: 1.
1985 18 UK : 7 ,  IRE : 5 ,  F R : 3 ,  B : 1 ,  D K: 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1986 11 UK : 8 ,  IRE : 2 ,  F R : 1 .
1987 15 UK : 8 ,  D : 3 ,  B : 2 ,  F R : 1 ,  P : 1 .
1988 13 UK : 7 ,  B : 2 ,  DK: 1,  0 : 1 ,  I R E : 1 ,  N L : 1 .




























































































T A B L E  T E N
T o t a l  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l *
Ye ar T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 li . UK : 8 ,  D : 2 ,  I T : 2 ,  N L : 2 .
19B1 3<* U K: 2 6 ,  D : 4 ,  N L : 4 .
1982 23 UK : 9 ,  FR: 7 ,  I T : 3 ,  D : 2 ,  B : 1 ,  D K: 1 .
1983 23 D : 7 ,  UK : 7 ,  F R : 4 ,  GR: 4,  D K: 1 .
1984 9 UK: 6 ,  B : 1,  D : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1985 i t UK : 8 ,  FR: 3 ,  D : 1 ,  GR:1,  I R E : 1 .
1986 17 UK : 5 ,  D : 4 ,  I R E : 4 ,  GR:2,  B : 1 ,  N L : 1 .
1987 11 UK : 18,  B : 1.
1988 21 UK : 12,  IRE : 3 ,  D : 2 ,  B : 1 ,  DK: 1 ,  GR: 1,  N L : 1 .
•Hay o n l y ,  and n o t  i n c l u d i n g  a u t h o r s '  s u p p l e m e n t a r i e s
TABLE ELEUEN
T o t a l  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  q u e s t i o n s  t o  EPC*
Ye ar T o t a l Ranked T o t a l s
1980 7 UK:3 ,  D : £ ,  N L : 2 .
1981 5 D: 3 ,  UK : 3 ,  B : 2 .
1982 10 FR: 4 ,  UK : 3 ,  D : 2 ,  GR: 1.
1983 5 DK: 3 ,  UK : 2 ,  0 : 1 .
19B4 5 FR: 2 ,  UK : 2 .
1985 11 D : 3 ,  FR: 3 ,  GR:2,  UK: 2 ,  I R E : 1 .
1986 9 UK: 3 ,  D : 5 ,  GR:2,  N L : 2 .
1987 9 GR: 4 ,  UK : 3 ,  B : 2 .
1988 $ UK : 3 ,  GR: 2 .
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